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SUBSIDIARITY IN THE MAINTENANCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 
SECURITY 
MACHIKO KANETAKE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The allocation of authority among multiple decision-making bodies involves 
the prioritization of one normative value over another. Subsidiarity, a principle 
regarding the allocation of authority, favors “decentralised decision making” at 
a lower level of governance over “centralised decisionmaking” at a higher level 
of governance.1 Centralization here means that one body’s decisions restrict 
other actors’ autonomous choices in a given society. In giving preference to 
localized decisionmaking, subsidiarity makes a particular normative claim that 
places greater importance on autonomy, diversity, and individual liberty than 
on effectiveness, coherence, and unity, which demand centralized 
decisionmaking.2 In the Catholic social thought in which the principle of 
subsidiarity was first articulated,3 subsidiarity was ultimately meant to help 
humans flourish, and one’s immediate human communities were considered as 
the best site for human flourishing.4 Given that subsidiarity is a normative claim, 
a shift of decision-making authority from one level to another would likely 
accompany a change in the prioritization of normative foundations on which the 
decisionmaking is based. 
International law essentially embraces the normative claim of subsidiarity: it 
is based on each state’s consent to be bound by a rule without any centralized 
legislative body. While subsidiarity is by no means established as a general 
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 1.  Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmermann, The Global Relevance of Subsidiarity: An Overview, 
in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY 1, 3–4 (Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmermann eds., 
2014) [hereinafter GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES] (noting that subsidiarity does not rule out the need for 
centralized decisionmaking, but that the need depends on the circumstances). 
 2.  See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994); Augusto Zimmermann, Subsidiarity, 
Democracy and Individual Liberty in Brazil, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 85, 88–89. 
 3.  QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, ENCYCLICAL OF POPE PIUS XI ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
SOCIAL ORDER (1931), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903–1939, 427–28, ¶¶ 78, 80 (Claudia 
Carlen Ihm, 1981); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine, 
in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 29, 31–36. 
 4.  Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity: The Concept and the Connections, 4 ETHICAL PERSP. 117, 118–
19 (1997). 
8-KANETAKE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:13 PM 
166 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:165 
principle in international law, its decentralized law-making processes almost 
take for granted the idea of subsidiarity, not only as a matter of fact, but also 
due to its respect for the principle of sovereign equality and the autonomy of 
every state. At the same time, the decentralized processes through which 
international law is made, applied, and enforced have been incrementally 
modified since the mid–twentieth century by the establishment of the United 
Nations (UN), the UN’s invigoration after the 1990s, and the growth of other 
international organizations and international courts. The active presence of 
international organizations and international courts in the creation, application, 
and enforcement of international law revived the question of subsidiarity as to 
how much international organizations and courts ought to respect the 
autonomy of each state’s decisionmaking. 
The maintenance of international peace and security, which is the topic of 
this article, is by no means immune to this question of subsidiarity. In essence, 
this area of law is increasingly torn between normative claims for centralization 
and those for decentralization. On the one hand, centralization is an ethos of 
collective security established under the UN Charter,5 and the UN Security 
Council’s internationally binding decisions also prevail over any other 
international agreements.6 Within the framework of Jachtenfuchs and Krisch’s 
introduction to this symposium, the maintenance of international peace and 
security appears to be one of the fields “in which a strong presumption in favor 
of the local is undesirable.”7 On the other hand, especially since the 1990s, the 
Security Council’s exercise of authority has had significant impact on the rights 
of individuals; illustrative are the practices of targeted sanctions, territorial 
administrations, and ad hoc international criminal tribunals. This exercise of 
authority has led to an increased call for bringing some of the decision-making 
processes back to the national level as a site more capable of ensuring respect 
for the rights of those affected individuals.8 
Against this background, this article analyzes how these opposite normative 
claims have arisen with regard to the Security Council’s mandate and whether 
there are any criteria under international law with which to balance these 
claims. In this article, the terms “subsidiarity” and “decentralization” are often 
used interchangeably; yet it must be reiterated that subsidiarity is much broader 
than decentralization. Subsidiarity is a value-laden claim that decentralized 
decisionmaking, as opposed to centralized decisionmaking, better protects 
autonomy, diversity, and individual liberty. 
 
 
 5.  U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
 6.  See infra Part II.A. 
 7.  Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2016,  at 1, 8. 
 8.  In the context of targeted sanctions, see Stephan Hollenberg, The Security Council’s 1267/1989 
Targeted Sanctions Regime and the Use of Confidential Information: A Proposal for Decentralization of 
Review, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 49, 62–69 (2015). 
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 This article deals with the locus of decisionmakers between the Security 
Council and its member states.9 The article makes particular reference to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has 
encountered tension during the last decade between, on the one hand, the 
effective maintenance of international peace and security at the Security 
Council’s level, and on the other hand, the protection of individuals’ rights at 
the level of member states. Part II.A of this article provides an overview of how 
the UN Charter concentrates decisionmaking at the Security Council for the 
imperative aim of international peace and security. Parts II.B and III show how 
the demand for decentralization reemerged with the greater relevance of the 
Council to individuals’ rights. Any compromise between the two claims 
struggles to be successful owing to their opposite nature. Yet the Security 
Council and its member states cannot afford to avoid such a struggle, as they 
are all committed to maintaining international peace and security and 
respecting individuals’ fundamental rights. 
II 
CENTRALIZED DECISIONMAKING 
The Security Council is an outcome of World War II that legitimized the 
restriction on individual states’ autonomous decisionmaking. In an essentially 
decentralized legal order, the UN Charter did its best to concentrate 
decisionmaking at the Security Council, whose priority, as discussed in part 
II.A, has been recognized outside the Charter’s treaty regime. Since receiving 
this power designated to it by the Charter, the Security Council has been 
exercising its centralized authority through its subsidiary organs in determining 
the status of individuals, as explained in part II.B. 
A. Elements of Centralization 
Although the term “centralization” is typically associated with a modern 
state with the authority to make and enforce law,10 in this article centralization is 
more broadly understood to signify that one body’s decisions restrict other 
actors’ autonomous choice in a given society. Despite being a “legalised 
hegemony,”11 the Security Council is by no means a centralized lawmaker or 
law-enforcer as it is ordinarily contemplated for a modern state. The Security 
Council’s decisions are, in principle, binding only on member states and only at 
the international level. Enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the 
 
 9.  It does not devote itself to the question of competence allocation between the Security Council 
and regional organizations. See generally W. Andy Knight, Towards a Subsidiarity Model for 
Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Operational, 17 
THIRD WORLD Q. 31 (1996); David O’Brien, The Search for Subsidiarity: The UN, African Regional 
Organizations and Humanitarian Action, 7 INT’L. PEACEKEEPING 57 (2000). 
 10.  See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100–02 (1952). 
 11.  See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 165–93 (2004) (discussing the processes through which states 
agree to legalize under the UN Charter the hegemonic power of the UN Security Council). 
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Charter are triggered by threats to the peace, and are probably not intended to 
be “sanctions” against a violation of Charter obligations or other international 
obligations.12 The Security Council’s authority is derived from the treaty 
concluded by states, which are instead the primary lawmakers and enforcers in 
the international legal order. Through the following three interrelated elements 
of the UN Charter, states have agreed, however, to centralize decisionmaking at 
the Security Council. 
1. Collective Security 
The first element is the idea of “collective security” itself, the very essence 
of which is to limit decentralized responses when a member acts against any 
other members and jeopardizes a common security interest. The Charter 
institutionalized the idea by prohibiting the use of force by individual states and 
by empowering the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII and internationally binding decisions under Article 25.13 Although 
a member state can still resort to the use of force in self-defense, it is presumed 
to be of a temporary nature until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.14 The UN is based on an 
unsuccessful attempt by the League of Nations to limit self-help, which 
characterizes a decentralized legal order.15 This attempt was hampered by the 
limited prohibition of war, the unanimous decision-making process, and the 
nonparticipation of the United States.16 Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, which reserved to individual states the right to resort 
to self-help if the Council of the League of Nations fails to reach a report, was 
the treaty’s most significant shortcoming. By remedying the weaknesses of its 
predecessor, the UN Charter transformed this decentralized international legal 
disorder of self-help to a collective system in which the use of force by 
individual states is prohibited. As the Security Council broadened the concept 
of international peace and security and a threat to the peace, the system of 
collective security under the Charter has been applied, not only to inter-state 
military confrontations, but also a wide range of non-inter-state situations.17 
2. Primary Responsibility 
The second element through which the UN Charter concentrated 
decisionmaking at the Security Council is provided by Article 24(1), which 
entrusts the Security Council with the “primary”—as opposed to subsidiary—
 
 12.  HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 789–90 (1950). 
 13.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, arts. 25, 39–42. 
 14.  Id. art. 51.  
 15.  HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (1957); KELSEN, 
supra note 10, at 15–17. 
 16.  See League of Nations Covenant art. 5, ¶ 1, arts. 12, 13, ¶ 4, art. 15, ¶ 6, art. 15 ¶ 7; ROBERT 
KOLB, INTRODUCTION AU  DROIT DES NATIONS UNIES 26–31 (2008).  
 17.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
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responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
“Responsibility” in this particular treaty provision falls short of constituting an 
obligation, yet it appears to signify a task rather than a mere competence.18 
Under Article 24(1) of the Charter, the Security Council’s primary 
responsibility is regarded as instrumental to “prompt and effective action” in 
the maintenance of international peace and security.19 In theory, the provision is 
meant to prioritize the Security Council over the General Assembly, and not 
over member states’ authorities or any other entities outside of the UN.20 
Nevertheless, the phrase “primary responsibility” has been invoked, from time 
to time, beyond the UN’s treaty regime as if it is a normative indication of the 
priority of the Security Council over a guardian of other purposes of 
international law, such as the promotion of respect for human rights.21 
Illustrative in this regard is the reasoning of the ECtHR, an international 
court outside of the domain of the UN Charter, in Behrami and Saramati,22 in 
which the Strasbourg Court referred to the “imperative nature” of the Security 
Council’s powers and the “primary responsibility” of the Council.23 In this case, 
the applicants brought proceedings against states that were stationed in Kosovo 
as part of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)24 and the 
Kosovo Force.25 In rendering the application inadmissible on the basis of the 
attribution of the conduct of states to the UN, the ECtHR drew attention to 
the imperative nature of the principle aim of the UN and, consequently, of the powers 
accorded to the UNSC under Chapter VII to fulfil that aim. . . . [I]t is evident from the 
Preamble, Articles 1, 2 and 24 as well as Chapter VII of the Charter that the primary 
objective of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security. While it is 
equally clear that ensuring respect for human rights represents an important 
contribution to achieving international peace . . . , the fact remains that the UNSC has 
primary responsibility . . . to fulfil [sic] this objective . . .
26
 
On this basis, the ECtHR, in order to not undermine the effectiveness of the 
UN’s operations for its “imperative peace and security aim,”27 observed that 
 
 
 
 
 18.  See Anne Peters, Article 24, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 
761, 766–67, ¶¶ 13, 18 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). Regional organizations, which can act as 
regional arrangements within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, employ the concept of 
“primary responsibility,” although its meaning is multi-faceted. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 117–20 (2011). 
 19.  Peters, supra note 18,  at 772, ¶ 35. 
 20.  Id. at 767, ¶ 17. 
 21.  Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No. 
71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 148 (2007). 
 22.  Behrami,  Eur. Ct. H.R. 42–43 (2007). 
 23.  Id. at 42–43, ¶ 148. 
 24.  S.C. Res. 1244, ¶¶ 5, 10, 11 (June 10, 1999). 
 25.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9.  
 26.  Behrami,  Eur. Ct. H.R. 42–43, ¶ 148 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 27.  Id. at 43, ¶ 149.  
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the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] cannot be interpreted in a manner 
which would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered 
by UNSC Resolutions . . . to the scrutiny of the Court.
28
 
The Strasbourg Court made these remarks presumably to indicate the 
relative weight of the Security Council’s mandate in comparison to the 
protection of human rights, and supposedly to explain why the Strasbourg 
Court deferred to the UN organ and its imperative mandate. The ECtHR 
referred to the reasoning of Behrami and Saramati in its subsequent case of 
Mothers of Srebrenica,29 which addressed the compatibility of the grant of 
jurisdictional immunity to the UN with the right of access to a court. In likewise 
dismissing the human rights complaint, the Strasbourg Court reaffirmed the 
importance of the fulfillment of the UN’s key mission in the field of 
international peace and security.30 
Overall, these limited cases show that the regional human rights court 
assumed both the priority of the Security Council’s competence for the effective 
maintenance of international peace and security and the relative importance of 
the Security Council’s mandate over the protection of human rights.31 When the 
member states’ courts follow the Strasbourg Court’s reasoning, the competence 
of the Security Council is preserved not only at the international level, but also 
in the domestic legal order. 
3. Primacy of Charter Obligations 
Article 103 embodies the third element by which the UN Charter 
concentrated decisionmaking at the Security Council.32 The provision provides a 
normative hierarchy of Charter obligations over other conflicting obligations 
that member states owe under international agreements. It bears particular 
importance to the Security Council, which is the only UN organ with the 
general authority to render binding decisions for its mandate,33 and whose 
internationally binding decisions prevail over any other obligations under 
international agreement.34 Of course, the primacy applies not only to the 
Security Council’s binding decisions but also to other Charter obligations. For 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R 255. 
 30.  Id. at 279, ¶ 154 (referring to Behrami and Saramati at 43, ¶ 149). 
 31.  But see infra Parts III.B, C.  
 32.  Article 103 of the UN Charter reads, “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
 33.  The General Assembly’s authority to render binding “decisions” is over the UN’s 
organizational issues. See U.N. Charter arts. 5, 6, 17, 18, ¶ 2; S. W. Afr. Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. 
S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 50–51 (July 18); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 
17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151, 163 (July 20). 
 34.  U.N. Charter art. 25; Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), Provisional 
Measure, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 15, ¶ 39 (Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 
Montreal Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 
Provisional Measure, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114, 126, ¶ 42 (Apr. 14). 
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instance, the primacy applies to the obligation of member states to award 
immunities to the UN and its officials under Article 105(1)–(2) of the Charter; 
this renders it difficult to readily apply the reasoning of Waite & Kennedy35 to 
the immunities granted to the UN, inasmuch as the obligation under Article 
105(1) of the Charter prevails over member states’ human rights obligations.36 
Yet the primacy of the obligation under Article 105(1) still has relevance to the 
Security Council’s subsidiary organs, which undertake peacekeeping operations 
in various parts of the world and enjoy jurisdictional immunities in a host state. 
Article 103 of the UN Charter therefore effectively signifies a preferential 
status of the Security Council’s exercise of authority over member states’ other 
commitments under international agreements. 
In principle, Article 103 of the UN Charter is a treaty provision applicable 
to UN member states, and it does not establish any general rule of hierarchy in 
international law.37 Despite the Charter’s constitutional characteristics,38 Article 
103 does not in theory establish an overarching rule for resolving normative 
conflicts between multiple treaty regimes. It is thus important to assess how 
Article 103 of the Charter is understood, in practice, by international and 
national courts in their application of other international treaties. 
A relatively clear sign of deference to the supremacy of Charter obligations 
came from the U.K. House of Lords (now Supreme Court) in Al Jedda,39 a 2007 
case concerning the human rights compatibility of the applicant’s detention by 
the British force deployed as part of the Security Council–authorized 
multinational forces in Iraq.40 Having identified a clash between the power to 
detain, as authorized by Security Council Resolution 1546,41 and the protection 
of the applicant’s right to liberty and security under Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the U.K. House of Lords held that the 
phrase “any other international agreement” in Article 103 of the Charter 
“leaves no room for any excepted category” and that binding Security Council 
decisions supersede all other treaty commitments.42 
In summary, the idea and system of collective security under Articles 24(1) 
and 103 of the UN Charter, in conjunction with Article 25 and Chapter VII, 
present a decisive normative articulation that the centralized responses 
necessary for the effective maintenance of international peace and security 
 
 35.  Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 393, 407–12. 
 36.  See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R 255, ¶¶ 152–69. 
 37.  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Collective Security and Human Rights, in HIERARCHY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 42, 63–64 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 
2012). 
 38.  Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International 
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 568–84 (1998). 
 39.  Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd071212/jedda-1.htm. 
 40.  S.C. Res. 1546, ¶¶ 9–10 (June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
 41.  S.C. Res. 1546, annex at 11 (June 8, 2004). 
 42.  Al-Jedda, [2007] UKHL 58, ¶ 35. 
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should not be disturbed by member states and their other international legal 
commitments. Such a normative claim has been recognized beyond the 
Charter’s treaty regime. At the same time, as explained in part III.B below, the 
Security Council’s preferential status has been incrementally counterbalanced 
through some of the affected individuals’ judicial proceedings in pursuit of 
better human rights protection. 
B. Extent of Centralization 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council could 
potentially engage in determining three groups of issues: (1) whether a 
particular situation qualifies as a matter of international peace and whether it 
amounts to one of the triggers under Article 39 of the Charter; (2) whether 
enforcement measures ought to be taken, what types of enforcement measures 
should be applied, and against whom those measures should be applied; and (3) 
through what means such measures should be implemented. Over the years, the 
Security Council and its subsidiary organs became involved in these stages in a 
way that allows member states to have little discretion over individuals under 
their jurisdiction. 
1. Extending the Concept of International Peace 
Although the system of collective security under the Charter was established 
as a system to respond to inter-state military confrontations, the Security 
Council has been applying the concepts of “international peace and security” 
and “threats to the peace” to a number of non-inter-state situations such as civil 
wars, humanitarian crises, and the systematic violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law in armed conflicts.43 The extension was 
partly in response to the advocacy in the 1960s and 1970s of newly independent 
Asian and African states, which, having encountered the Rhodesian and South 
African questions, urged the inclusion of human rights agendas into the matter 
of international peace and security44 and even preempted the Security Council 
in determining the threats.45 The conceptual extension, which illustrates the 
Security Council’s greater emphasis on the protection of individuals and their 
rights,46 has enabled the Council and its subsidiary organs to exercise their 
authority in a way that is much more relevant to those individuals. 
 
 
 43.  Nico Krisch, Article 39, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra 
note 18, at 1272; INGER ÖSTERDAHL, THREAT TO THE PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION BY THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER 9–17 (1998). 
 44.  See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3–15 (1994); N. 
D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 164–69 (2d ed. 1997). 
 45.  See WHITE, supra note 44, at 164–69. With respect to Rhodesia, see G.A. Res. 2022 (XX), ¶ 13 
(Nov. 5, 1965); S.C. Res. 232, ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 1966); S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 1965). About South 
Africa, see G.A. Res. 2054 (XX), ¶ 6 (Dec. 16, 1965). 
 46.  Krisch, supra note 43, at 1279, ¶ 15. 
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The extension of the Security Council’s mandate has occasionally met 
opposition from member states. For instance, a number of states raised fierce 
opposition when the Security Council debated climate change in 2007 as part of 
the maintenance of international peace and security.47 At the same time, the 
specific oppositions have not amounted to the general claim on the allocation of 
competence that the concept of international peace and security (and threats to 
the peace) ought to be defined, not by the Security Council, but by the General 
Assembly or each member state. 
2. Target Specification 
The question of competence allocation came to the fore regarding the 
process of designing nonmilitary enforcement measures. Since 1994, the 
Security Council and its sanctions committees have directly designated specific 
individuals and entities as the targets of asset freezes and travel bans instigated 
under Article 41 of the UN Charter.48 Before the introduction of targeted 
sanctions, the Security Council, having determined the overall strategic targets 
of economic sanctions, had still left member states to specify the targets of 
restrictive measures. In the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, for 
instance, the Security Council required member states to prevent, except for 
medical, educational, and humanitarian purposes, the import of all commodities 
from Southern Rhodesia, the sale of commodities to any person therein, the 
transfer of funds, and the travel of Southern Rhodesian citizens and those 
residents who “furthered or encouraged” Southern Rhodesia’s unlawful 
actions.49 Although these frameworks were designed by the Security Council, it 
was still for member states to specify permissible humanitarian exceptions or 
residents who furthered or encouraged the unlawful actions.50 There was then a 
sanctions committee, the Watchdog Committee, yet it had only a passive 
mandate to gather and report information about national implementation.51 The 
targeted sanctions regimes therefore shifted a member states’ competence to 
the Security Council and the Council’s sanctions committees insofar as the 
designation of specific targets was concerned. 
 
 47.  U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5663d mtg. at 24–25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5663 (Apr. 17, 2007); U.N. 
SCOR. 61st Sess., 5663d mtg. at 12, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5663 (Resumption 1) (Apr. 17, 2007). 
 48.  For a list of targeted sanctions, see Machiko Kanetake, Catching Up with Society—What, How, 
and Why: The Regulation of the UN Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions, in L’ÊTRE SITUÉ, 
EFFECTIVENESS AND PURPOSES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 255, 262 n.27 (Shotaro Hamamoto et al. 
eds., 2015). 
 49.  S.C. Res. 253, ¶¶ 3(a), 3(d), 4, 5(a), 5(b) (May 29, 1968). 
 50.  See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law, in 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33, 51–52 
(Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004). 
 51.  S.C. Pres. Statement S/8697 (Jul. 29, 1968); S.C. Res. 253, ¶ 20 (May 29, 1968). See P.J. Kuyper, 
The Limits of Supervision: The Security Council Watchdog Committee on Rhodesian Sanctions, 25 
NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 159–94 (1978). 
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3. Direct Implementation 
A shift of competence is arguably most comprehensive when the Security 
Council, through its subsidiary organs, directly executes its decisions vis-à-vis 
individuals and entities, instead of asking national governments to implement 
international decisions, as in the case of economic sanctions. Territorial 
administration and ad hoc international criminal tribunals are two major 
categories of practice in this regard. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council’s subsidiary organs directly administered war-torn territories 
such as Kosovo and East Timor.52 Although the UN Operation in the Congo 
had engaged in civil administration in the early 1960s,53 the administration of 
territories by the Security Council’s subsidiary organs became much more 
comprehensive in the 1990s. The organs prescribed and enforced a wide range 
of decisions that had immediate effect on local inhabitants. In Kosovo, for 
instance, UNMIK was vested with “[a]ll legislative and executive authority with 
respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary.”54 UNMIK has 
engaged in determining tax rates,55 administering social welfare,56 issuing 
licenses,57 resolving property claims,58 privatizing public enterprises,59 ordering 
the detention of individuals,60 and so on and so forth, just as a government 
would, and exercised its authority directly over the local populations. 
The creation of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the 1990s 
provides another example of when the Security Council’s subsidiary organs 
directly executed their decisions vis-à-vis a restricted category of individuals. By 
exercising wide discretion under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,61 the Security Council 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
 52.  S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999); S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). 
 53.  Sally Morphet, Organizing Civil Administration in Peace-Maintenance, 4 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 41, 43–44 (1998). 
 54.  Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Authority of the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, sec. 1.1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999). 
 55.  E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On Excise Taxes in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/2000/2 (Jan. 22, 2000). 
 56.  E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Establishment of the 
Administrative Department of Local Administration, UNMIK/REG/2000/10 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
 57.  E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Licensing and Regulation of the 
Broadcast Media in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2000/36 (June 17, 2000). 
 58.  E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Establishment of the Housing 
and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, UNMIK/REG/1999/23 
(Nov. 15, 1999). 
 59.  E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Establishment of the Kosovo 
Trust Agency, UNMIK/REG/2002/12 (June 13, 2002). 
 60.  See, e.g., Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No. 3 on the Conformity of 
Deprivations of Liberty under ‘Executive Orders’ with Recognised International Standards (June 29, 
2001), http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E4010629a_526704.pdf. 
 61.  Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 28–38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995); Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 61 (July 13 ,1954). 
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(ICTY) in 199362 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
in 2004.63 The ICTY and ICTR were accorded authority to issue orders, not only 
against the states concerned (namely former Yugoslavian states and Rwanda) 
or other UN member states, but also against the accused and other individuals 
such as witnesses.64 
4. Deepening the Claims of Supremacy 
The aforementioned three groups of practice—targeted sanctions, territorial 
administration, and ad hoc criminal tribunals—added another dimension to the 
priority of the Security Council’s competence and the supremacy of Charter 
obligations. With regard to targeted sanctions, Article 103 of the Charter is 
applicable to member states’ obligations to implement the Security Council’s 
sanctions and thereby to the designation of specific targets undertaken by the 
Council’s sanctions committees. As far as the target designation is concerned, 
the sanctions regimes allow virtually no discretion to member states.65 This 
would mean that the listed individuals and entities effectively bear the 
consequence preserved by the preferential status given to the Security Council’s 
exercise of authority. 
The claim of supremacy was even deepened with regard to the UN’s 
territorial administration and ad hoc criminal tribunals. In the case of territorial 
administration in Kosovo, UNMIK’s regulation promulgated by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and subsidiary instruments issued 
thereunder “[took] precedence” over the preexisting domestic law in Kosovo if 
the latter conflicted with the former.66 Likewise, the Security Council extended 
its claim of supremacy with regard to the ICTY and ICTR. Under the tribunals’ 
statutes, the ICTY and ICTR have primacy over national courts.67 Under the 
tribunals’ rules of procedure, the obligations of states to cooperate with the 
tribunals68 “prevail over any legal impediment” to the surrender or transfer of 
the accused or of a witness to the tribunals.69 Such normative primacy is 
 
 62. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993). 
 63.  S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).  
 64.  Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 19(2), 
adopted 25 May 1993 by Security Council Resolution 827 (last amended by Resolution 1877 of 7 July 
2009); ICTY, R. P. EVID. 54, IT/32/Rev.49 (adopted on 11 February 1994, as last amended 22 May 
2013) (Dec. 10, 2009). For the details of the ICTY’s decisions and orders concerning individuals’ rights 
and obligations, see Shuichi Furuya, Legal Effect of Rules of the International Criminal Tribunals and 
Court upon Individuals: Emerging International Law of Direct Effect, 47 NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 111 
(2000). 
 65.  Cf. Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 255, ¶ 180 (noting that Switzerland enjoyed 
some latitude in implementing the UN’s listing decisions). 
 66.  Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/1999/24, § 1.1 (Dec. 12, 1999). 
 67.  Updated Statute for Yugoslavia, supra note 64, art. 9(2); Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Rwanda, 33 ILM 1598, art. 8(2) (1994). 
 68.  Updated Statute for Yugoslavia, supra note 64, art. 29; Statute of Rwanda, supra note 67, art. 
28. 
 69.  ICTY, R. P. EVID. 58, IT/32/Rev.49 (adopted on 11 February 1994, as last amended May 22, 
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claimed, not only over extradition treaties, but also over national law.70 The 
claim of supremacy over domestic law in the contexts of territorial 
administration and ad hoc international criminal tribunals is not derived from 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, but is instead based on the Security Council’s 
authority under Chapter VII. 
III 
DECENTRALIZING DECISIONMAKING 
As the exercise of authority by the Security Council and its subsidiary 
organs increasingly bears resemblance to the exercise of authority by national 
governments against individuals, it becomes apparent that legal safeguards 
available to the affected individuals at the UN level are significantly 
underdeveloped compared to those available at the domestic level, as 
highlighted in part III.A. As discussed in parts II.B and II.C, the inadequacy of 
human rights protection has generated calls for shifting decisionmaking from 
the Security Council to a lower level of governance in part based on the 
doctrine of equivalent protection. 
A. Respecting Human Rights while Maintaining International Peace and 
Security 
The UN Charter by no means exempts the guardian of international peace 
and security from respect for fundamental rights. Under Articles 24(2) and 1(3) 
of the Charter, the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes 
of the UN, including the promotion of respect for human rights and for the 
universality of fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, the interpretation of these 
Charter provisions does not categorically suggest that the UN (and therefore its 
organs) is formally obligated to ensure respect for human rights established 
under customary law or major human rights treaties.71 Neither the fact that the 
UN has international legal personality nor the development of the rules of 
international institutional law is sufficient to bind the UN with international 
human rights law.72 
The less stringent normative constraint is combined with some pragmatic 
obstacles for the UN’s efforts in respecting human rights. First, the UN does not 
have a standing judicial venue in which the affected individuals may bring their 
human rights claims. Although the Security Council can, in principle, establish 
judicial organs whose findings could also bind the Council as far as it is so 
intended,73 political stakes may be too high to create a judicial body that has the 
 
2013) (Dec. 10, 2009); ICTR, R. P. EVID. 58, ITR/3/Rev.1 (June 29, 1995). 
 70.  ICTY, R. P. EVID. 58, IT/32/Rev.49 (adopted on 11 February 1994, as last amended May 22, 
2013) (Dec. 10, 2009); ICTR, R. P. EVID. 58, ITR/3/Rev.1 (June 29, 1995). 
 71.  See Machiko Kanetake, The Interfaces Between the National and International Rule of Law: 
The Case of UN Targeted Sanctions, 9 INT'L. ORGS. L. REV. 267, 278–80 n.37–44 (2012). 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
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competence to review the Council’s own exercise of authority.74 Second, if the 
provision of legal safeguards involves the handling of intelligence, the UN has 
to rely on information provided by member states, since the UN does not have 
a general capacity to collect, as opposed to receive, international intelligence 
concerning certain individuals.75 To facilitate the receipt of information, the UN 
must improve security protocols for the handling of information, security 
clearances for staff, and disciplinary procedures.76 Third, the General 
Assembly’s Fifth Committee may not be willing to endorse the operational 
costs associated with legal safeguards that could further legitimize the extension 
of the Security Council’s exercise of authority. 
The normative and pragmatic factors have led to various claims that certain 
fundamental rights have been jeopardized by the institutional practices of the 
Security Council and its subsidiary organs. First, a well-known criticism has 
been leveled against the Security Council’s targeted sanctions. The sanctions 
regime against Al Qaeda in particular,77 owing to the geographical proliferation 
of the targeted individuals, triggered criticism of the encroachment on the 
individuals’ right to property;78 a person’s privacy, reputation, and family 
rights;79 the right to a fair hearing;80 and the right to an effective remedy.81 
Second, one of the key concerns regarding the UN’s territorial 
administrations was their compatibility with the residents’ right of access to 
courts.82 Despite being deeply linked with inhabitants, the UN administrations 
were protected by jurisdictional immunities and the idea of functional necessity 
to justify them.83 The aforementioned Behrami and Saramati case84 was brought 
against states that are party to the ECHR, apparently because the applicants 
could not have brought comparable judicial proceedings against the UN itself. 
The ECtHR’s inadmissibility decision in Behrami and Saramati, which 
 
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 61 (July 1954). 
 74.  In the context of targeted sanctions, see Machiko Kanetake, Enhancing Community 
Accountability of the Security Council Through Pluralistic Structure: The Case of the 1267 Committee, 12 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 113, 166–68 (2008). 
 75.  See SIMON CHESTERMAN, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
70–71 (2006). 
 76.  Id. at 4, 33–35. 
 77.  S.C. Res. 1989 (June 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1390, ¶ 2 (Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8(c) (Dec. 
19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 78.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 79.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 80.  Id. art. 14; see Kanetake, supra note 71, at 283 n.59–60. 
 81.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 79, art. 2(3). 
 82.  See, e.g., Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 1 on the Compatibility with 
Recognized International Standards (Apr. 26, 2001), http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/ 
docs/E4010426a_86354.pdf. 
 83.  Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of 
KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Aug. 18, 2000). For 
UNTAET, see Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 103, 118 (2002). 
 84.  Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No. 
71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). 
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emphasized the imperative nature of the Security Council’s mandate,85 therefore 
closed the limited possibility for the affected individuals to legally contest the 
human rights compatibility of the acts of member states and indirectly those of 
the UN. 
Finally, the adequacy of human rights protection has also been questioned 
with regard to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Particularly 
disturbing was the ICTR, which addressed its own infringement of the accused’s 
rights during arrest and detention.86 In the Semanza case,87 for instance, the 
ICTR’s Appeals Chamber accepted that there were violations in the accused’s 
right to be properly informed of the charges and the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention. The review by the ICTR itself, however, is limited. 
This is because some of these human rights obligations were attributable to 
member states, and the ICTR does not have competence to determine the 
responsibility of member states for violating human rights during the process of 
arrest, detention, and imprisonment.88 
B. Supremacy Counterbalanced 
In the absence of international judicial venues to which the affected 
individuals can successfully bring their human rights claims against the UN, 
some of the individuals, such as the applicants of Behrami and Saramati, 
resorted to domestic courts, regional human rights courts, or EU courts to 
challenge the compatibility of the implementing decisions of state authorities 
with constitutional safeguards and international human rights law. The judicial 
proceedings then provided the occasion to test the priority of the Security 
Council and the primacy of Charter obligations against the protection of those 
individuals’ rights. 
Judicial responses have taken multiple forms, ranging from acceptance, jus 
cogens review, avoidance, and the use of critical language, to consequential 
resistance. On the one hand, judges have indeed accepted the priority of the UN 
Security Council and the supremacy of relevant obligations. For instance, there 
have been several litigations concerning the orders of the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals on the basis of the compatibility with domestic or 
international law of the national decisions that gave effect to the tribunals’ 
orders.89 Judicial review has generally been lenient. The District Court in The 
 
 85.  See supra notes 26–28 and corresponding text. 
 86.  For instance, the ICTR accepted the violations of the fundamental rights of the accused in 
Barayagwiza (1999, 2000). See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision (Nov. 
3, 1999); Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for 
Review or Reconsideration) (Mar. 31, 2000). 
 87.  Semanza (Laurent) v. Prosecutor, Decision, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 87, 114 
(May 31, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-20/appeals-chamber-
judgements/en/050520.pdf; Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 323–39 
(May 20, 2005). Likewise, the violations of the accused’s rights were acknowledged in Kajelijeli (2005). 
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A, Judgment, ¶¶ 251–53 (May 23, 2005). 
 88.  E.g., Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A, Judgment, ¶ 252 (May 23, 2005). 
 89.  See Jean  D’Aspremont & Catherine M. Brölmann, Challenging International Criminal 
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Hague, in Milošević v. ICTY,90 found no competence to assess the human rights 
compatibility of the ICTY’s procedures, and in so holding, relied on the ICTY’s 
primacy over national courts and Article 103 of the Charter.91 In the earlier case 
of Dragan Opacić v. The Netherlands, the Hague District Court likewise found 
itself unable to review the ICTY decisions.92 In Lukić Milan s/Captura, the 
Argentinian court affirmed the priority of the ICTY’s request.93 The Croatian 
Constitutional Court was also willing to accept the ICTY’s primacy over 
domestic courts in the Bobetko Report case.94 Likewise, in Naletilić the Croatian 
Constitutional Court found constitutional the surrender of the accused to the 
ICTY, ultimately based on the preference of the Tribunal over national courts.95 
The Naletilić case was subsequently brought before the ECtHR, which 
characterized the ICTY as offering “all the necessary guarantees including 
those of impartiality and independence.”96 The trust on the ICTY’s impartiality 
was reiterated in Milošević v. The Netherlands before the Dutch court.97 
On the other hand, in several decisions, judges have deferred to the 
supremacy of the obligations under the UN Charter, yet still sent a critical 
signal to the Security Council and its subsidiary organs that there was some 
potential for judicial review. For instance, a Swiss court in the Rukundo case, 
which was brought against the state’s decision to transfer Mr. Rukundo to the 
ICTY, did not decline to engage in a review.98 Although the Swiss court 
ultimately deferred to the Security Council and its subsidiary organ by 
presuming the legality of the ICTY’s establishment and procedure, the Court’s 
indication might have served as a warning to the Security Council and its 
 
Tribunals Before Domestic Courts, in CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 111, 113–25 (August Reinisch ed., 2011). 
 90.  Slobodan Milošević v. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Hague 
District Court, Feb. 26, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1310 (2002). 
 91.  Id. at 1313–14. Similarly, Slobodan Milošević v. Neth, District Court of The Hague, Aug. 31, 
2001, 41 I.L.M. 86, ¶ 3.5. (2001). 
 92.  Dragan Opacić v. Neth., District Court of The Hague, 30 May 1997, Kort Geding KG 97/742, 
cited in GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION OF 
EVIDENCE: OBLIGATIONS OF STATES 144 (2002); Alfred H.A. Soons, The Netherlands,  in NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 341, 369 (Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004).  
 93.  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia v. Lukić (Milan), Case No. 
11807/05, Decision on Arrest, Surrender, and Extradition, , ILDC 1083 (AR 2006) (Jan. 10, 2006). 
 94.  Bobetko Report, Croatia, Review of Constitutionality and Legality, Case No. U-X-2271/2002, 
ILDC 383 (Nov. 12, 2002). 
 95.  Decision No. U-III-854/1999, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Oct. 21, 
1999), http://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksWen.nsf/29e2e5c6bdc241f4c1257de1004a9d1e/ec37116102ae7b6f
c1257e5f003e56b3/$FILE/U-III-854-1999.docx. 
 96.  Mladen Naletilić v. Croatia, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 489, ¶ 1(b). 
 97.  Slobodan Milošević v. Neth., District Court of The Hague, Aug. 31, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 86 (2002). 
The Milošević case before the ECtHR was rejected on the basis of the nonexhaustion of domestic 
remedies. See Milošević v. Neth., App. No. 77631/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2002). 
 98.  Rukundo v. Federal Office of Justice, Appeal Judgment, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Aug. 31, 2001, Cases No. 1A129/2001 and 1A130/2001, ILDC 348. 
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subsidiary organs to have respect for basic human rights.99 A somewhat artificial 
jus cogens review should also be understood in a similar manner. In its 2005 
decision in Kadi I, the General Court (then Court of First Instance) deferred to 
the UN Charter’s primacy, which structurally limited the judicial review of 
Security Council resolutions.100 Yet the General Court still managed to preserve 
its judicial scrutiny by resorting to jus cogens,101 which is often considered 
superior to UN Charter obligations.102 
Judges also do their best to avoid the conflicts and the question of Article 
103 of the Charter,103 circumventing the pronouncement of their deference to 
the supremacy of Charter obligations through multiple techniques. First, courts 
can simply refrain from addressing the question of supremacy at all. Although it 
is difficult to assess whether or not courts deliberately avoided the question, an 
example may be the Ntakirutimana104 case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit regarding the unconstitutionality of the surrender of the 
individual to the ICTR. There, the Fifth Circuit did not actively comment on 
the issue of whether the ICTR had the capacity to protect due process rights.105 
The second avoidance technique is to interpret Security Council resolutions 
in such a way that they are understood as leaving discretion to member states. 
The ECtHR in Nada, regarding the implementation of the Security Council’s 
Al Qaeda sanctions regime, reinterpreted Council resolutions as if they had left 
certain latitude to a state.106 This interpretation allowed the Strasbourg Court to 
find Switzerland in violation of the applicant’s rights, on the basis that the state 
had the latitude to harmonize its international obligations under Security 
Council resolutions and its human rights obligations under the ECHR.107  
The third method of avoidance is to interpret Security Council resolutions 
with the rebuttable presumption that the Council acts in conformity with human 
rights. The ECtHR in the aforementioned Al-Jedda case applied “a 
presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation 
on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights”108 and 
observed that the Council’s resolutions must be read “most in harmony”109 with 
 
 99.  See ERIKA DE WET, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: LECTURE 19 (2011). 
 100.  Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II–03649, ¶¶ 212–25. 
 101.  Id. ¶¶ 226–90.  
 102.  See, e.g., Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, Article 103, in THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 2110, 2119–20, ¶ 19. Cf. Nico Krisch, 
Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 1237, 1259–60, ¶ 46. 
 103.  Tzanakopoulos, supra note 37, at 52. 
 104.  Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 255, ¶¶ 176–80. Cf. Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 281–84 (Bratza, J., Nicolaou, J., Yudkivska, J., concurring); Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 286–
88, ¶¶ 2–10 (Malinverni, J., concurring). 
 107.  Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 176–180. 
 108.  Al-Jedda v. U.K., 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 373–74, ¶ 102. 
 109.  Id. The presumption is rebuttable. Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 172; Stichting Mothers of 
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human rights obligations. In Al-Jedda, the ECtHR managed to avoid a 
normative conflict by assuming the conformity of Security Council Resolution 
1546 with Articles 1(3) and 24(2) of the UN Charter and therefore the 
resolution’s human rights compatibility.110 
Apart from the avoidance of normative conflicts, judges can use critical 
language in order to show their dissatisfaction with the UN. For instance, with 
regard to targeted sanctions, Justice Zinn of the Canadian Federal Court in the 
Abdelrazik case111 criticized the sanctions’ regime against Al Qaeda as “a denial 
of basic legal remedies and as untenable under the principles of international 
human rights,”112 despite the fact that it was not strictly necessary to refer to the 
sanctions committee’s procedure. In A and Others before the U.K. Court of 
Appeal, an English judge chose the powerful term “prisoners of the state”113 to 
characterize the state of those targeted, which was reiterated by the U.K. 
Supreme Court and further by the General Court of the EU in its 2010 decision 
in Kadi II.114 In Kadi II, the General Court also described targeted sanctions as 
“particularly draconian”115 for the targeted individuals. 
In addition to the use of critical remarks, judges can contest the UN’s 
decisionmaking by the consequences of judicial findings. This is possible for 
domestic and EU courts (but not international courts), which can resort to 
dualism and the autonomy of each legal order. By so doing, judges can both 
avoid the question of supremacy and consequentially challenge the UN’s 
decisions. This was the method employed by the Court of Justice of the EU in 
its 2008 decision in Kadi I, in which the Court of Justice defended the autonomy 
of the EU legal order and did not fully invite a normative conflict under 
international law into its sphere of analysis.116 On this basis, the Court of Justice 
has found three-part infringement of Kadi’s rights: to be heard, to an effective 
legal remedy, and to respect for property.117 
In summary, from an overview of the judges’ nuanced responses to the 
implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and its subsidiary 
organs, one can observe a certain level of hesitation among the guardians of 
regional human rights treaties and the domestic rule of law in fully accepting 
the priority of the Council’s competence and the supremacy of related 
obligations within their judicial reasoning. 
 
Srebrenica v. Netherlands, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R 255 ¶ 145. 
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 112.  Id. ¶ 51. 
   113.    A and Others v. HM Treasury [2008] EWCA Civ 1187, ¶ 125. 
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from EWCA Civ.); Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-05177, ¶ 149. 
 115.  Kadi, 2010 E.C.R. II-05177, ¶ 149. 
 116.  Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 
2008 E.C.R. I–06351. 
 117.  Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. I–06351, ¶¶ 338–371. 
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C. Bosphorus for the UN 
Domestic and regional litigation regarding decisions of the Security Council 
and its subsidiary organs is likely to continue in the immediate future. The 
human rights safeguards at the level of the Security Council and its subsidiary 
organs, despite certain incremental improvements, may not be satisfactory 
when compared to the domestic standards accepted by some member states. A 
question then arises as to whether international law itself justifies the 
competence of domestic courts (or other domestic authorities) to review the 
Security Council’s decisionmaking, and, as a result of the review, to reject the 
decisions of the Council and its subsidiary organs. 
One possible ground, albeit within a particular international treaty, is the 
applicability of an equivalent-protection test even to a state’s obligation under 
Security Council resolutions or the decisions of its subsidiary organs. The test is 
notably formulated by the ECtHR in Bosphorus v. Ireland.118 In the case, the 
applicant, a Turkish airline, argued that Irish authorities infringed upon its right 
to property119 after the authorities had impounded the applicant’s aircraft, which 
was leased from a Yugoslavian airline. The impoundment was based on the 
regulation of the EU (then–European Communities) derived from Security 
Council Resolution 820 on the Yugoslavia sanctions.120 In dismissing the 
complaint, the ECtHR put forward the notion of equivalent protection; when 
states are obliged to abide by obligations based upon their membership of an 
international organization, such states are presumed to be in compliance with 
the ECHR “as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect human 
rights” in a manner “equivalent” to the protection under the ECHR.121 The 
presumption is rebutted if the protection is “manifestly deficient.”122 In 
Bosphorus, Ireland was presumed to be in compliance with the treaty because 
the European Court of Justice and national courts provided a remedy to 
individuals.123 
In principle, the equivalent-protection doctrine cannot readily be invoked 
when states must carry out the obligations under the Charter, which prevail 
over conflicting international obligations under Article 103.124 While the 
Bosphorus case itself was about the implementation of the Security Council’s 
economic sanctions to which Article 103 applies, the equivalent-protection 
doctrine was nonetheless invoked. This invocation was possible because, first, 
 
 118.  Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107. The test was formulated based on: M. & Co. 
& Matthews v. UK. M. & Co. v. The Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 13258/87, 64 DR 138, 145 
(Feb. 9, 1990); Matthews v. The U.K., 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251. 
 119.  Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 9 ETS 155. 
 120.  Council Regulation (EEC) 990/93, art. 8, 1993 O.J. (L 102/14); S.C. Res. 820, ¶ 24 (Apr. 17, 
1993). 
 121.  Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 155. 
 122.  Id. ¶ 156. 
 123.  Id. ¶¶ 163–65. 
 124.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
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the ECtHR determined the balance between Ireland’s obligation under the 
ECHR and the state’s obligations under EU law, not the balance between the 
ECHR and the obligation under the Charter. Second, the Yugoslavia Sanctions 
Committee issued guidance to impound the aircraft in question in response to 
the Irish inquiry125 and such guidance was less stringent and determinative than 
the sanctions committees’ proactive designations of specific targeted 
individuals. Finally, the restriction on the right to property can be more flexible 
than the individuals’ right to a fair hearing. The conflict between human rights 
obligations and the obligations relating to the UN sanctions was not as 
irreconcilable as it was in the case of the UN’s targeted sanctions. 
Owing to the special status of Charter obligations, the Bosphorus test 
initially had not been applied to the cases involving the implementation of the 
decisions of the UN Security Council and its subsidiary organs. The ECtHR in 
Nada regarding the Al Qaeda sanctions regime referred to Bosphorus, yet not 
in relation to equivalent protection.126 The Strasbourg Court in Al-Jedda 
concerning the Security Council-authorized multinational force did not discuss 
Bosphorus despite the fact that the latter case was relied on by the applicant.127 
The ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati, concerning the UN’s territorial 
administration and the Security Council–authorized multinational force, 
distinguished the case from Bosphorus on the grounds that the acts and 
omissions in Behrami and Saramati were carried out neither by state authorities 
nor within the territory of the states.128 
A sign of change emerged, however, with the decision of the ECtHR’s 
Second Section in Al-Dulimi,129 which is pending before the Grand Chamber as 
of December 1, 2015. In this case, the Court found a violation of the right to a 
fair hearing130 of the applicants, who had been designated as targets by the 
Security Council’s sanctions committee for the Iraq sanctions regime.131 The 
Second Section’s decision was the first occasion on which the ECtHR explicitly 
applied the equivalent-protection test, not to the EU, which implemented the 
Security Council’s resolutions, but to the UN itself.132 Having accepted that the 
listing and delisting procedures at the UN level do not provide equivalent 
protection,133 four out of seven judges on the Court134 found that the very 
 
 125.  Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 19–32. 
 126.  Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 255, ¶ 168.  
 127.  Al-Jedda v. U.K., 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 373–74, ¶ 95. 
 128.  Behrami & Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 43–44, ¶ 151 (2007). 
 129.  Al-Dulimi & Mont. Mgmt Inc. v. Switz., App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, 58, ¶ 118–21 
(2013). 
 130.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 
1950, ETS 5. 
 131.  S.C. Res. 1518 (Nov. 24, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 23 (May 22, 2003). 
 132.  Maurizio Arcari, Forgetting Article 103 of the UN Charter? Some Perplexities on “Equivalent 
Protection” after Al-Dulimi, 6 QIL QDI 31, 31–41 (2014). 
 133.  Al-Dulimi, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 118–121. On the equivalent protection, the 
Chamber distinguished Al-Dulimi from Nada on the basis of the lack of member states’ discretion in Al 
Dulimi with regard to asset freeze measures. Al-Dulimi, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 117. For the 
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essence of the right of access to a court was impaired due to the lack of effective 
and independent judicial review at the UN and domestic levels for a 
considerable period of time.135 The ECtHR held that 
for as long as there is no effective and independent judicial review, at the level of the 
United Nations . . . it is essential that [the listed] individuals and entities should be 
authorised to request the review by the national courts of any measure adopted 
pursuant to the sanctions regime.
136
 
This short passage in the decision of the Second Section manifests the claim 
of decentralization, or the idea of subsidiarity, discussed in this article. 
According to the Court, the lack of judicial review would justify and require 
domestic judicial review of the measures that give effect to the UN’s sanctions 
regime. 
It remains to be seen whether the equivalent-protection doctrine could 
potentially serve as a criterion with which to internationally justify the shift of 
competence from the Security Council to member states. Even if it does, the 
doctrine of equivalent protection itself has not yet been accepted outside the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Finally, the doctrine might not even arise with 
regard to territorial administration if the claims instituted against member-state 
authorities are rejected via attributing the impugned conduct to the UN. 
International law has yet to furnish a yardstick with which to balance the 
Security Council’s exercise of authority for the effective maintenance of 
international peace and security with member states’ competence to protect 
individuals’ rights. Nevertheless, the preferential status of the Security Council 
and its mandate has been incrementally counterbalanced by avoidance and 
confrontational responses on the part of domestic and regional courts. This 
counterbalance contributes to the political deliberation concerning the 
allocation of competence. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
As a treaty established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war,”137 the UN Charter placed a priority on the effective maintenance of 
international peace and security and therefore on its guardian, the Security 
Council. The priority is based on the historically embedded assumption that the 
need for a swift international response to threats to the peace should override 
respect for each state’s autonomous decisionmaking. Consistent with this 
 
summary and analysis of Al Dulimi (2013), see generally Stephan Hollenberg, The Diverging 
Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights in the Cases of Nada and Al-Dulimi, 64 INT’L. 
COMP. L. Q. 445 (2015). 
 134.  Al-Dulimi, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶ 63 (Sajó, J., partly dissenting) (observing that 
the case should be inadmissible due to the lack of discretion left to member states and the supremacy of 
the UN). 
 135.  See id. ¶¶ 129–34. 
 136.  Id. ¶ 134. 
 137.  U.N. Charter, supra note 13, ¶ 1.  
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assumption, the Charter strongly resists the idea of subsidiarity, which places 
greater importance on autonomy at a lower level of governance, in an 
essentially decentralized international legal order. 
Especially since the 1990s, the UN Security Council and its subsidiarity 
organs have been exercising their centralized authority under the Charter in a 
way that has had significant impact on individuals and private entities, as 
illustrated by the extensive use of targeted sanctions, the direct administration 
of war-torn territories, and the establishment of ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals. Despite the extent of impact, international human rights law does not 
bind the UN in the same manner that it binds UN member states. Nor does the 
UN have a standing judicial body accessible to the affected individuals. The 
limited human rights protection at the level of the UN has invited growing calls 
to leave autonomy to the national level, which is generally assumed to be better 
equipped to safeguard individuals’ rights. At present, international law provides 
little guidance on how to strike a balance between the competing claims of 
centralization and decentralization. The interpretation of the Charter or 
international institutional law applicable to the UN does not provide workable 
criteria. 
The crux is that there are several pragmatic and normative difficulties even 
if the UN would be willing to decentralize some of its decision-making 
processes. Such difficulties limit the “supply of subsidiarity” discussed in this 
issue’s introduction.138 One difficulty is determining the level of member states’ 
involvement that maintains centralized decisionmaking at the UN. The case of 
targeted sanctions reveals the difficulty in determining the most appropriate 
involvement of member states. A number of proposals have been discussed in 
order to create the space for member states’ decisionmaking and to better 
ensure respect for human rights.139 One idea is to condition the Security 
Council’s initial designation to the indictment or equivalent decisions by 
domestic courts.140 Yet due to the divergence among 193 states—in terms of 
their domestic courts’ procedures, admissible evidence, standards of proof, and 
degree of independence and impartiality—the member states cannot be obliged 
by the Security Council to mutually recognize other national courts’ decisions in 
their respective national legal order. An alternative idea is to allow states to 
subsequently review the designation initially made by the Security Council and 
its sanctions committees.141 Yet this means that the sanctions regimes effectively  
 
 
 
138.   Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 7, at 16–17. 
 139.  See, e.g., Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 72 NORD. J. INT’L. L. 159, 196–214 (2003); Peter Gutherie, Security 
Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491, 524–41 
(2004); Kanetake, supra note 74, at 164–70. 
 140.  See Cameron, supra note 139, at 204.  
 141.  E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/65/258 (Aug. 6, 2010). 
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lose their ability to oblige all states, not only like-minded states, to apply 
restrictive measures.142 
Another intricacy involves determining whether member states are indeed 
in a better position to protect human rights. The circumstances of ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals reveal this dilemma. Due to the dilution of 
political support and nonpayment of budget contributions by some UN member 
states, the Security Council decided to decentralize the criminal trial and utilize 
domestic judicial venues as part of the completion strategy proposed in 2000.143 
The use of national courts facilitates the prosecution of international crimes in a 
way that is possibly less costly for the UN itself. For this purpose, the Office of 
the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ICTY proposed 
the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
the Security Council endorsed in 2003.144 
Yet the decentralization gave rise to the concerns as to whether national 
courts could fully conform to “internationally recognised standards of human 
rights and due process” in the trials of referred persons.145 The possible 
interference by political bodies, the impartiality of judges, and the adequate 
protection to witnesses were some of the lingering concerns.146 In fact, the ICTY 
rendered several decisions not to transfer cases to the Rwandan national courts, 
despite judicial reform, the abolishment of the death penalty, the enactment of 
domestic legislation regarding the transfer, and the extensive prosecution of 
crimes dealt with by the ICTR.147 At the same time, a positive side of 
decentralization is that it subjects decisionmaking to judicial review by 
international courts. In fact, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Maktouf and 
Damjanović held in 2013 that the War Crimes Chamber within the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which the ICTY referred its cases, breached Article 
7 of the ECHR by retroactively applying the 2003 Criminal Code, as opposed to 
the 1976 Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
without effective safeguards against the imposition of a heavier penalty.148 Such  
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review might not have been possible had the decision been entirely made by the 
Security Council’s subsidiary organ. 
Overall, the UN Charter’s initial attempts to resist the idea of subsidiarity 
may have been subject to modification. The proper allocation of competence 
should be assessed against the objectives sought in a given society, and in this 
sense, the relationships between the Security Council and member states should 
also be viewed “in symbiotic rather than antagonistic terms.”149 The Security 
Council and its subsidiary organs cannot readily escape the demand for greater 
utilization of member states in part because the protection of individuals’ rights 
is becoming intrinsic to the concept of international peace and security. Given 
that both the Security Council and member states are committed to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and respect for fundamental 
rights, the allocation of competence between them should not be a static matter; 
instead, it should be amenable to a constant shift depending on the capacity of 
the UN and member states to materialize the shared objectives. 
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